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The basal ganglia play a fundamental role in decision-making. Their contribution is typi-
cally modeled within a reinforcement learning framework, with the basal ganglia learning
to select the options associated with highest value and their dopamine inputs convey-
ing performance feedback. This basic framework, however, does not account for the role
of cholinergic interneurons in the striatum, and does not easily explain certain dynamic
aspects of decision-making and skill acquisition like the generation of exploratory actions.
This paper describes basal ganglia acetylcholine-based entropy (BABE), a model of the
acetylcholine system in the striatum that provides a uniﬁed explanation for these phenom-
ena. According to this model, cholinergic interneurons in the striatum control the level of
variability in behavior by modulating the number of possible responses that are considered
by the basal ganglia, as well as the level of competition between them. This mechanism
provides a natural way to account for the role of basal ganglia in generating behavioral vari-
ability during the acquisition of certain cognitive skills, as well as for modulating exploration
and exploitation in decision-making. Compared to a typical reinforcement learning model,
BABE showed a greater modulation of response variability in the face of changes in the
reward contingences, allowing for faster learning (and re-learning) of option values. Finally,
the paper discusses the possible applications of the model to other domains.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed an amazing advancement in our
understanding of the basal ganglia circuit. This progress has been
made possible by the convergence of neuroscientiﬁc data with
increasingly sophisticated computational models of the circuit.
Despite these advances, a number of structural and functional
characteristics of the basal ganglia remain unaccounted for, such
as the microstructure of the striatum, the role of behavioral vari-
ability for skill acquisition, and the balance of exploration and
exploitation indecision-making. This paper describes anewmodel
of the acetylcholine system in the striatum that furthers our cur-
rent understanding of the basal ganglia and provides a uniﬁed
explanation for these phenomena.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. The
ﬁrst section will provide a brief overview of functional anatomy of
the basal ganglia, their role of in decision-making, and some cur-
rently problematic aspects of basal ganglia functions. The second
section will describe the proposed framework and a neurocompu-
tationalmodels that implements it. The third sectionwill detail the
results of two decision-making tests that were performed to ver-
ify our framework’s predictions. Finally, the implications of our
framework will be discussed.
FUNCTIONAL ANATOMY OF THE BASAL GANGLIA
Because this paper will often refer to speciﬁc aspects of the basal
ganglia physiology, this section will provide a brief overview of
their functional anatomy. The basal ganglia are a set of intercon-
nected nuclei located at the center of the brain, and they play an
important role in many cognitive functions, including working
memory (McNab and Klingberg, 2008), reasoning (Stocco and
Anderson, 2008), learning (Packard and Knowlton, 2002), and
even language (Friederici, 2006; Prat and Just, 2011) The nuclei
in the circuit form part of a series of loops from and to the cortex
(Alexander et al., 1986).Within the circuit, the striatum serves s the
input nucleus, receiving projections from the entire cortex. On the
other hand, the pars reticulata of the substantia nigra (SNr) and
the internal part of the globus pallidus (GPi) serve as the output
nuclei, which project to and control the activity of the thalamic
nuclei that project to the frontal lobes. Thus, the basal ganglia
are placed in the ideal location to control behavior by regulating
signals to the frontal cortex.
The current understanding of the arrangement of the nuclei
within the circuit dates back to Albin et al. (1989), and is sum-
marized in Figure 1. According to their framework, the output
of the circuit is the result of two competing pathways: a direct
pathway that originates in the striatonigral (SN) cells of the stria-
tum, and an indirect pathway that originates in the striatopallidal
(SP) cells and proceeds through the external globus pallidus and
the sub-thalamic nucleus. A “hyperdirect” pathway that proceeds
from the cortex to the thalamus through the sub-thalamic nucleus
also exists, but researchers are divided as to its exact functions (see
Gurney et al., 2001; Nambu et al., 2002; Frank et al., 2007, for
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FIGURE 1 | Simplified representation of the striatal circuitry within the
basal ganglia system. Excitatory projections are marked with a “+”;
inhibitory projections with a “−.” Glutamatergic neurons and projections
are represented in red; GABA-ergic, in blue; Dopaminergic, in yellow;
cholinergic, in green. SP, striatopallidal projection neuron; SN, striatonigral
projection neuron; GABA, GABA-ergic interneuron; TAN, tonically active
(cholinergic) neuron; Da, dopaminergic neuron.
three alternative accounts), and will not be discussed further in
this paper.
Researchers generally agree that basal ganglia perform a selec-
tion of possible signals by means of competing excitatory and
inhibitory pathways. These competing signals are thought to orig-
inate in the striatum in response to cortical excitatory inputs.
Responses originating in the striatum are thought to represent
a subset of possible “actions” that are associated to the incom-
ing cortical signals. What exactly constitutes an “action” depends
on the contents of the signals being passed to the frontal lobes;
thus, depending on the context, actions might consist of decisions
(Barto, 1995), working memory updates (Frank et al., 2001), or
motor programs (Berns and Sejnowski, 1998).
BASAL GANGLIA AND DECISION-MAKING
The crucial link between action selection and decision-making
is provided by the dopamine pathways that converge on the stria-
tum (see Figure 1). Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that promotes
synaptic plasticity in the corticostriatal synapses, thus determining
the degree of association between cortical inputs and SN and SP
responses (Wickens et al., 1996;Calabresi et al., 2000). Importantly,
the release of dopamine has a direct but non-trivial relationship
to the rewards connected to an action.
Dopamine is normally released in response to primary rewards,
such as food. However, when a primary reward becomes reliably
associated to a predictive cue, dopamine neurons cease to ﬁre in
response to the reward itself, and instead begin responding to
the cue. Consider, for example, a classic conditioning experiment
where a monkey receives a drop of juice a few moments after see-
ing a visual cue (Schultz et al., 1993). Dopamine neurons initially
increase their ﬁring rate in response to the juice. However, after
the monkey has learned that the juice is anticipated by a visual cue,
dopamine neurons ﬁre when the cue is presented, but not when
the juice is delivered. Conversely, when the cue is presented but the
juice is later omitted, dopamine release is reduced instead (Schultz
et al., 1993; Schultz, 1998).
This pattern of data can be accounted for by assuming
that dopamine reﬂects the difference between real and expected
rewards. In artiﬁcial intelligence, such an error term is used in rein-
forcement learning algorithms to learn the expected value (i.e., the
amount of reward) of an action (Sutton, 1988; Sutton and Barto,
1998). This mechanism offers an elegant theory for interpreting
how the basal ganglia can discover the true“value”of each possible
action based on its previous rewards, and thus selecting the best
action available.
The reinforcement learning framework can be easily trans-
ported in the domain of decision-making by treating the possible
options for a decision as alternative actions. In this case, the
response of SN and SP cells in the striatum reﬂects the amount of
reward that is expected by each option, and dopamine response
represents the difference between the expected and real payoff
of a decision. In neuroimaging studies of decision-making, for
example, activity in the striatum correlates with a decision’s per-
ceived expected payoff (Delgado et al., 2003; O’Doherty, 2004;
Schönberg et al., 2007) or its success probability (Tricomi et al.,
2004; Delgado et al., 2005), and even with individual differences
in the preference between alternative decision options (Tom et al.,
2007). The connection between decision-making and reinforce-
ment learning becomes even stronger when one considers iterative
decision-making paradigms, where the true value of each option
needs to be learned through repeated selections. Thus, although
alternatives exist (Gonzalez et al., 2003; Fum and Stocco, 2004),
reinforcement learning models of the basal ganglia have been fre-
quently applied to decision-making tasks (Frank et al., 2004; Frank
and Claus, 2006; Biele et al., 2009).
In summary, the basal ganglia can be understood as a neural
mechanism for selecting actions based on previous reward. This
framework can be successfully applied to the ﬁeld of decision-
making, where it has proven successful in account for a wide range
of behavioral and neuroimaging data in human decision-making.
THREE PROBLEMS IN CURRENT BASAL GANGLIA RESEARCH
The reinforcement learning framework has been successful at
explaining the role of the basal ganglia not only in decision-
making, but also in other domains, such as procedural learning
(Barto, 1995; Suri and Schultz, 1998; Frank et al., 2001; Packard
and Knowlton, 2002) and working memory (O’Reilly and Frank,
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2006; McNab and Klingberg, 2008). Despite this success, a number
of problems still remain that need to be addressed. This section
will review three of these issues that deal with physiology, learning,
anddecision-making. The following sectionswill provide evidence
that the same mechanism (i.e., modulation of response variability
by striatal cholinergic interneurons) represents a solution to all
three, apparently unrelated, problems, and sheds further light on
the connection between basal ganglia and decision-making.
The role of acetylcholine in the striatum
All models of the basal have to make simplifying assumptions
about the physiology of the striatum. By making these assump-
tions, however, one runs the risk of sacriﬁcing some structural
characteristics that are crucial to basal ganglia function. Here, we
argue that one of these crucial features is the role of interneurons
in the microcircuitry of the striatum.
Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the connections between
different types of neurons in the striatum. Roughly speaking,
it contains two classes of cells; (a) Projection neurons, which
comprise the SN and SP neurons discussed above; and (b) Stri-
atal interneurons, which can be further divided into cholinergic
interneurons and different sub-types of GABA-ergic interneurons
(Bolam et al., 2000; Tepper and Bolam, 2004).
Cholinergic interneurons form a circuit that is neurochemically
separated from the rest of the striatum, which is mostly made up
by GABA-ergic (i.e., inhibitory) synapses. Because they are char-
acterized by an elevated ﬁring rate at rest, they are also known
as tonically active neurons (TANs). TANs inﬂuence both other
interneurons and projection neurons, therefore playing a central
and strategic role in orchestrating the activity of the striatum.
While projection neurons ultimately determine the competi-
tion between direct and indirect pathways, striatal interneurons
play a crucial role in modulating the response of projection neu-
rons by exerting a powerful inhibitory inﬂuence (Tepper and
Bolam, 2004).
Despite their remarkable properties, cholinergic interneurons
are often omitted in computational models of the basal ganglia,
with the exception of those models designed to capture speciﬁc
physiological properties (Tan and Bullock, 2008; Humphries et al.,
2009, 2010). In fact, many of the computational cognitive models
of the basal ganglia (Barto, 1995; Beiser and Houk, 1998; Suri and
Schultz, 1998; Frank et al., 2001; Gurney et al., 2001) assume that
the striatum is made only of projection neurons, and that their
activity is limited by some indirect mechanism – for instance, by
artiﬁcially imposing a limit on the number of SN and SP cells that
can be active at any given time (e.g., Frank et al., 2001).
When TANs had been included in a model, they were found
to play an important functional role for cognition and behav-
ior. For instance, in Stocco et al. (2010) TANs were needed to exert
context-dependent inhibitionof unwanted actions. In theirmodel,
the basal ganglia actions can be thought of as production rules;
for each “rule,” the TANs specify the condition (e.g., the context
upon which actions should be applied) and projection neurons
determine the “action.” Thus, this model embodies the idea that
TANs’ activations are context-dependent and direct the activity
of projection neurons (as suggested, for instance, by Apicella,
2007). Alternatively, in Ashby and Crossley’s (2011) model, TANs
modulate learning and skill acquisition by keeping non-relevant
striatal projection neurons outside the scope of dopamine-based
Hebbian learning.
This paper puts forward a hypothesis on the functional role
of cholinergic interneurons that uniﬁes these previous accounts.
According to this hypothesis, by controlling the amount of inhi-
bition exerted on projection neurons, TANs effectively control
the number of possible actions to be performed at each moment,
thus restricting the possible actions to either the optimal response
or widening the range to different (optimal and non-optimal)
responses. Furthermore, this paper suggests that the range of pos-
sible selections depends on dopamine-based reward signals, with
TANs increasing the range of possible actions when previously
learned routines lose their effectiveness.
Behavioral variability during skill acquisition
A second problem with existing views of basal ganglia function
concerns our current view of the basal ganglia role in learning.
For examples, there is considerable amount of evidence suggesting
that the basal ganglia contribute to the acquisition of procedural
skills (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Knowlton et al., 1996; Packard
and Knowlton, 2002; Seger and Cincotta, 2005; Yin and Knowl-
ton, 2006), although the precise mechanisms by which they are
acquired are still debated. For instance, some researchers believe
that skills are permanently encoded in the basal ganglia (Ander-
son, 2007), while others believe that they are encoded in the
basal ganglia initially, but eventually re-encoded in the form
of corticocortical pathways (Pasupathy and Miller, 2005; Stocco
et al., 2010). Still, others believe that the basal ganglia simply
facilitate the acquisition of skills in form of corticocortical con-
nections (Ashby et al., 2007, 2010). Despite their differences, all
these theories share a common view of the basal ganglia as a
fast learning system, which quickly detects and encodes associ-
ations between patterns of signals occurring in different cortical
areas.
Given that the basal ganglia are an evolutionary old struc-
ture, one might expect that this interpretation would hold across
species, especially in instances where complex skill acquisition
is relevant. Instead, this view is at odds with what is known of
the basal ganglia role in one of the most studied examples of
complex skill acquisition in animals, birdsong learning (Brainard
and Doupe, 2002). During the song learning phase, birds produce
vocalizations trying to match a tutor’s template song. While learn-
ing eventually results in the acquisition of a crystallized and stable
song, during the learning process birds explore different vocaliza-
tions until they converge on the template. The learning process is
supported by various nuclei of the songbird’s brain (Brainard and
Doupe, 2002; Nottebohm, 2005; Aronov et al., 2008), including
the bird’s equivalent of the basal ganglia – the anterior forebrain
pathway (AFP; Nottebohm, 2005). Contrary to what would be
expected on the bases of studies on mammals and primates, dam-
age to the bird’s AFP does not impair the acquisition of a song;
instead, it severely diminishes the ﬁnal song’s quality by reducing
the variety of vocalizations produced during the learning process
(Gardner et al., 2005; Olveczky et al., 2005). These ﬁndings sug-
gest that the AFP controls variability during the acquisition of a
birdsong, rather than mediating its encoding as a ﬁxed routine.
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In summary, a conceptual contradiction seems to exist between
the role of the basal ganglia in skill acquisition in humans and
in birdsong learning. The current consensus in skill acquisition
research is that the ganglia support learning by rapidly acquiring
stimulus–response associations. Research on birdsong learning,
however, suggests that the basal ganglia provide random varia-
tions in the patterns of learned vocal responses, instead of ﬁxing
them into stable patterns as suggested by the skill acquisition view.
Given the fact that both types of learning depend on the same
structure, it would be desirable to have a single framework that
accounts for both.
Although the exact mechanism by which variability is intro-
duced into vocalizations is unknown (and it might be ultimately
underpinned by a different and speciﬁc neural mechanism), this
paper puts forward the hypothesis that the generation of variabil-
ity during songbird learning is mediated by striatal cholinergic
interneurons. In particular, the framework proposed in this paper
attempts to solve this contradiction by modeling the striatum as
a two-level system. At the lower level, dopamine release is used to
associate cortical inputs with proper responses; this level accounts
for the fast acquisition of ﬁxed behavioral responses during skill
acquisition. At the upper level, acetylcholine modulates the num-
ber of responses that can be applied at eachmoment,manipulating
the degree of competition between possible actions and, in turn,
the variability of behavioral responses. In turn, thismechanismcan
be used generate variability in a songbird’s vocalizations during the
learning process.
Exploration and exploitation in decision-making
Response variability plays an important role in decision-making
as well, and its exact nature and origin represents the last issue
addressed in this section. In their basic form, reinforcement learn-
ing models of the basal ganglia consider only one parameter in
the selection of an action (namely, its expected value), and would
not consider other parameters such as the uncertainty of its own
estimates (Doya, 2008).
However, instead of blindly trusting one’s own internal esti-
mates of reward, animals and humans agents balance between
exploitation and exploration, i.e., making decisions based on the
current knowledge of the environment or explore novel options
and courses of actions. In this context, exploitation refers to a pol-
icy where a decision-maker always selects the option that, in the
past, has been associated with the highest rewards; and exploration
indicates the deviations from this strict policy to re-explore sub-
optimal or previously unexploredoptions. Exploration is related to
response variability because, when an agent explores new options
(instead of sticking with the ones that are currently deemed the
best), the variability of its own behavior increases.
There are a number of circumstances where exploration can be
more beneﬁcial than exploitation. Consider, for instance, the case
of a mouse navigating in search of food in a new maze: being the
environment novel, the rat beneﬁts from examining the existing
alternatives before settling for one in particular. Exploration is also
advantageous when contingencies between actions and rewards
suddenly change. Every creature lives in a changing, dynamic envi-
ronment, where a successful behavioral routine might suddenly
become inappropriate. For instance, a rat might learn that a path
through themaze is blocked, and a birdmight learn that its current
song does not attract females (Or, for that matter, a scientist might
ﬁnd out that a certain theory does not explain a new set of data).
When the environment changes, the rewarding values of actions
that have been previous learned in the past become untrustworthy,
and alternative course of actions must be explored.
Conversely, circumstances exist where capitalizing on the
learned values (LV) of each action is advantageous. This is the
case, for instance, when the surrounding environment is stable,
and all the possible options have been explored thoroughly.
The balance between exploration and exploitation is related
to the problem of how much trust an agent should put into its
own knowledge of the environment. Intuitively, it makes sense
for an agent to explore more when it is uncertain about the state
of the environment. A number of authors have suggested that,
as dopamine conveys information about the difference between
predicted and expected rewards, other neurotransmitters could
encode the amount of conﬁdence an agents has about its own esti-
mates. Such a role has been proposed, for instance, in the case of
norepinephrine (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005b; Bouret and Sara,
2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005; Dayan and Yu, 2006).
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the balance
between exploration and exploitation can be interpreted in terms
of the amount of response variability originating in the striatum.
Variability is ultimately controlled by cholinergic interneurons and
modulated by dopamine, providing a way to capture exploration
in decision-making with the same parameters and inputs that are
available to reinforcement learning models of the basal ganglia.
Summary
We have reviewed three existing problems with the current under-
standing of basal ganglia function, i.e., the problem of accounting
for striatal microcircuitry, the problem of reconciling the role of
the basal ganglia in skill acquisition and in birdsong learning, and
the problem of how response variability in controlled in decision-
making. This article explores the hypothesis that the cholinergic
interneurons (i.e., TANs) in the striatum provide a common
response for these problems, and that their role can be seen as
modulating response variability on the basis of expected rewards.
The next sections will further specify this hypothesis as imple-
mented in a computational model, and describe its application to
a decision-making task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The theory behind the framework makes the following three
assumptions: (1) in the basal ganglia, each action is represented
by speciﬁc set of neurons in the striatum; (2) the incoming corti-
cal projections transmit information about the current state of the
environment; and (3) the activity of striatal neurons is a function
of their strength of association with the cortical patterns (which,
in turn, is a function of the previous history of rewards). In rein-
forcement learning terms, the cortical inputs constitute the state
of the system S, and the various pools of neurons that are acti-
vated by S represents the set of possible actions a1. . . aN. Because
the associations between S and each pool of units is a history of
reward, the activations A1, A2, . . . AN of the neurons reﬂect their
expected value V, i.e., Ai∼Vi.
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A rational system will base the probability of choosing each
action on the distribution of activations among all the possible
actions, choosing the most active ones the most often. A standard
way to capture this is to transform each value into a corresponding
probability by means of a Boltzmann distribution:
p (ai) = e
V (i)/T
∑
j e
V (j)
/
T
(1)
Where p(ai) is the probability of selecting action ai, Vi is the
value (i.e., expected reward) of action i, and T is a global para-
meter, known as temperature, that regulates how deterministic
the choice between competing actions is. The parameter T can
be seen as a means to balance between exploration and exploita-
tion: as T approximates zero, decisions converge deterministically
toward the highest-value action, while larger values of T produce
increasingly more uniform distributions of probabilities across
different actions and lead to more unpredictable choices.
It is problematic to relate the activation of neurons encoding an
action ai to the quantity eV(i)/T. In the Boltzmann equation, the
denominator T has the functional role of magnifying the differ-
ences between different values of V. Within a neural framework,
however, one must work within simple additive quantities. One
way to capture the effect of temperature is through a adaptive
inhibitory threshold. The mechanism works as follows. Figure 2
illustrates a simple, idealized case where three actions (A, B, and
C) are encoded by the three different neurons. The activation of
each cell is represented by the height of the corresponding bar. In
particular, the full length of each bar represents the total excita-
tory inputs; the black line represents a common inhibitory input;
and the black top of a bar, above the black line, represents the
amount of activation remaining after subtracting the inhibitory
effect. This remaining activation (the dark, top parts of each bar)
is the quantity entered into Eq. 1.
The amount of competition between alternative options can
be modulated raising or lowering the dark line, i.e., the shared
inhibitory input. For instance, one can increase exploration by
lowering inhibition, as shown in Figure 2C. Alternatively, one can
increase exploitation by raising the inhibitory value until only the
most active option A is considered (Figure 2B). In fact, lower-
ing or raising inhibition permits to ﬁnely calibrate the relative
magnitudes of each option.
Thus, we have established a correspondence between the term
T in a Boltzmann equation and a widespread inhibitory signal
across projection neurons. The second term corresponds to a
widespread inhibitory neural input, which should be roughly con-
stant across neurons encoding for competing actions. Cholinergic
interneurons seemparticularly adapt to provide such awidespread
inhibitory signal, because they provide a very dense cholinergic
innervation of the striatum, which is ampliﬁed by their control
of GABA-ergic interneurons (Koós and Tepper, 2002; Bonsi et al.,
2011), and because their activity is correlated (Morris et al., 2004).
Thus, this paper suggests that one of the their functional roles
is to modulate noise in action selection at the level of the stria-
tum, playing a computational role akin to the T parameter in the
Boltzmann equation.
FIGURE 2 | How widespread inhibition modulates response variability.
The panels depict three hypothetical situation where three neurons are
active, corresponding to three possible, responses (A, B, C). Each neuron’s
activation is represented by the height a corresponding bar; widespread
inhibitionT is represented as a horizontal line. In (A) widespread inhibitionT
limits the selection to options A and B. The ﬁnal selection will be
determined by their relative activations above threshold (dark gray part of
the bars). (B,C) represent different versions of the same situation, where
the exploration/exploitation tradeoff is modulated by the raising [(A)
increased exploitation] or lowering [(B) increase exploration] the inhibitory
thresholdsT.
Onemight wonderwhich circumstancesmake variability desir-
able. In general, response variability (i.e., exploration) can be
seen as a mechanism to foster learning, and variability should
increase in situations that demand a reﬁnement of knowledge of
the environment. Two intuitive examples of such situations are
when an agent initially learns the values of available options, and
when changes in the environments cause strong violations of the
expected payoffs of an options (e.g., “expected” and “unexpected”
uncertainty, according to Yu and Dayan, 2005). An alternative way
of framing this problem is to see response variability and explo-
ration as inversely proportional to the conﬁdence an agent has
in its own knowledge; the more reliable the knowledge, the less
advantageous it is to explore the values of different options.
Conﬁdence (or, alternatively, uncertainty) in one’s own current
knowledge can be gathered from performance feedback. In the
striatum, performance feedback is conveyed by dopamine neu-
rons, whose ﬁring rate is proportional to the difference between
expected and actual rewards (Schultz, 1998, 2002). For example, a
positive dopamine response signals that the actual outcomes are
larger than expected. Such a signal implies that the previous choice
was correct. Under such circumstances, the probability of making
the same choice should increase and, correspondingly, exploration
should be reduced. On the contrary, a negative dopamine sig-
nal implies that previous estimates were incorrect, and alternative
decisions should be explored.
In addition to conveying performance feedback, dopamine
also modulates synaptic plasticity (Wickens et al., 1996; Calabresi
et al., 2000b). Thus, a positive dopamine response strengthens the
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synapses between cortical inputs and projection neurons, making
the response more likely to occur. At the same time, dopamine
strengthens the response of at least certain types of interneurons,
such as fast-spiking interneurons (Bracci et al., 2002) to the same
cortical inputs, thus increasing the level of inhibition, and limiting
the number of potential active neurons.
By linking variability to dopamine response, this framework
establishes a straightforward method for controlling the balance
of exploration and exploitation based on internal measures of
behavioral performance.
IMPLEMENTING AND TESTING THE FRAMEWORK: THE BABE MODEL
The previous section has established the connection between the
activity of striatal inhibitory interneurons and the variability in
decision-making. This section provides experimental support for
the validity of this framework by describing a neurocomputational
model, named basal ganglia acetylcholine-based entropy (BABE),
that embodies it, and by proving its validity through simulations of
decision-making tasks. In order to test the viability of the proposed
framework, the BABE model was tested on a decision-making
task that stresses the importance of response variability and adap-
tive behavior in reinforcement-based decision-making. The next
sections will ﬁrst introduce the experimental task, then the model
designed to perform it (and its comparison to other models), and
ﬁnally the results of two tests of its performance.
The task
The task consists of a simpliﬁed version of the probabilistic selec-
tion (PS) task, ﬁrst introduced by Frank et al. (2004) to study the
role of dopamine and basal ganglia in decision-making.
In the original task, participants were repeatedly presented with
pairs of Japanese Hiragana characters, and required to choose one
character from each pair by pressing a key on the keyboard. For
simplicity, we will indicate each character with one of the Latin
letters A through F. Selecting each character resulted in a feed-
back message (either “Correct”ors “Incorrect”) that was presented
visually to the participant. Each character was associated with a
different probability of yielding a “Correct” outcome. The partici-
pants’ goal was to select from each pair the character that was more
likely to be “correct.”
The stimuli were presented as Hiragana characters in order to
look unfamiliar to the original sample of American participants,
and thus be difﬁcult to verbalize. This prevented participants from
reverting to strategies that relied on declarative memory (such as
explicit encoding and recall of previous decisions), and pushed
them toward a more“implicit” and reinforcement-driven decision
strategy instead.
Three possible pairs of characters combinations were given,
which we will indicate as AB,CD, and EF. Within each pair, one of
the characters (A, C, and E) had a high probability of being “cor-
rect,” and the other (B, D, and F) had a low probability. However,
feedback was always binary so that participants had to discover
the different probabilities associated with each option by repeat-
edly sampling each character in the pair. The probabilities were
varied across characters, as showed in Table 1.
Although it was designed to verify speciﬁc experimental pre-
dictions (such as the differential effects of dopamine for high- and
low-probability stimuli) that lay beyond the scope of this paper,
the task represents an ideal test-bed for our framework for three
reasons. First, it was explicitly designed to be implicit in nature and
depend on a procedural learning system that most authors (Cohen
and Squire, 1980; Knowlton et al., 1996; Packard and Knowlton,
2002; Seger and Cincotta, 2005) associate with the basal ganglia,
thus providing a natural application of our computational results
to the real world. Second, it is an iterative multi-option decision-
making paradigm, and thus it belongs to a class of tasks that are
frequently used in the decision neuroscience literature (Bechara
et al., 1994; Bowman andTurnbull, 2004; Fellows and Farah,2005).
Third, it manipulates both the reward probability associated to
each option (from A’s 80% to B’s 20%) and the levels of reward
discriminability within each pair (from the high discriminability
pair AB to the low-discriminability pair EF).
To facilitate the testing of our framework, one crucial modiﬁ-
cation has been applied to the PS task. In the simulated version,
the model is free to indicate each of the six possible options as a
response for each pair. While this modiﬁcation makes each pair
presented akin to a simple pair-speciﬁc cue (as there is nothing
left in the pair AB that explicitly limits the possible choices to A
and B only), it permitted to let the model develop its own internal
representations of the decision context, without having to directly
encode it in the architecture.
The model
Developing a model to test this framework requires putting
together threedifferent components. First,oneneeds tohave a sim-
ple but plausible model of the cortico-basal ganglia loop, reﬂecting
the major anatomical features of the circuit. Second, one needs
to connect the basal ganglia circuit to a plausible reinforcement
learning system, so that it can learn which actions to perform in
response to environmental stimuli. These ﬁrst two components are
common to virtually every existing reinforcement learning model
of the basal ganglia. The third component is instead speciﬁc to our
framework and a few other models only (Stocco et al., 2010; Ashby
and Crossley, 2011), and consists of a layer of striatal interneurons,
providing the diffuse inhibition that modulates variability.
The next section will brieﬂy describe the architecture of the
BABEmodel,how it relates to thebasal ganglia functional anatomy,
and how it performs the PS task. The model’s architecture is illus-
trated in Figure 4, while Figure 5 provides a visual rendition of
its real implementation. A complete description of the model’s
implementation and dynamics can be found in the Appendix.
The cortico-basal ganglia system
The main component of the BABE model is the cortico-basal gan-
glia system. This system is responsible for selecting an option (i.e.,
either A or B) when given a particular decision (i.e., the pair AB).
Thus, it can be thought of as the analogous of the “actor” in the
actor–critic framework (Barto, 1995).
The system was designed to be simple while respecting the gen-
eral anatomy of its biological counterpart. It includes two pools
of neurons supposed to represent cortical areas, which are named
“Context” and“Time” layers (see Figure 4). The Context layer rep-
resents the current decision context, i.e., the current pair of stimuli
that are presented in a trial of the PS task (AB, CD, or EF). This
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Table 1 | Summary of the different trial types (“Pairs”) used in the PS task and the probability of each stimulus being associated with a reward.
Pair High-probability stimulus Probability of correctness (%) Low-probability stimulus Probability of correctness (%)
AB A 80 B 20
CD C 70 D 30
EF E 60 F 40
layer can be thought of as a working memory region holding con-
textual information (hence the name), and receiving input (e.g.,
visual inputs of the characters presented on the screen) from pos-
terior sensory regions (left unmodeled). The Time layer maintains
a representation of the time course of each decision-making trial.
As a trial progresses, neuronal activation moves across the “Time”
layer from front to back. Thus, when a new decision-making trial
is presented, only one neuron in the ﬁrst row will be active; when
the model provides a response, only one neuron in the second row
will be active; and, ﬁnally, when feedback is delivered, one neuron
in the third row will be active.
Both the Time and the Context layers in turn project to the
dorsal striatum, which is made up of three interrelated sets of
neurons: a set of tonically active (i.e., cholinergic) interneurons,
labeled as “TAN”; and two set of striatal projection neurons, rep-
resenting the striatonigral (“SN”) and striatopallidal (“SP”) cells,
respectively. This section will focus on the role of the SN and SP
units, while TAN interneurons will be discussed later.
Although SN and SP cells have ultimately opposite effects
within the basal ganglia circuitry, their competition does not man-
ifest itself at the level of the striatum. SN and SP cells domake large
inhibitory connections between each other, but these connections
are extremely weak (Jaeger et al., 1994). Instead, as outlined in
the Introduction, SN and SP cells send inhibitory projections to
the other nuclei downstream in the basal ganglia hierarchy, orig-
inating the direct pathway and the indirect pathway (Albin et al.,
1989; DeLong, 1990). Both pathways eventually converge on the
pars reticulata of the SNr and the GPi, two nuclei that control the
medial and dorsal nuclei of the thalamus and their projections to
the cortex. Although both the direct and the indirect pathways are
made of inhibitory projections, their different number of segments
results in SN cells having a net excitatory effect on the thalamus,
and the SP cells having a net inhibitory action. Because of their
effects downstream on the circuit, these two types of neurons are
thought to signal either the execution (SN cells) or the vetoing (SP
cells) of one particular action or motor program. For example,
in the successful prefrontal–basal ganglia working memory model
(PBWM; Frank et al., 2001; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006) the two
groups of neurons are explicitly referred to as “Go” and “No Go”
cells.
Since the competition between the SN and SP cells of the stria-
tum plays an important role in our framework, the distinction
between the two groups of cells has been maintained in the model.
The exact arrangement of the direct and indirect pathways, how-
ever, has been simpliﬁed. In particular, the output nuclei of the
basal ganglia (SNr and GPi) and the intermediate nuclei of the
indirect pathway (e.g., external part of the globus pallidus and the
sub-thalamic nucleus) have been omitted, so that the SN and SP
cells project directly to the model thalamus (see Figure 4). This
FIGURE 3 | Architecture of the BABE model. Excitatory projections are
marked with a “+”; inhibitory projections with a “−”; black arrows
represent modulatory or control signals. SP, striatopallidal projection
neurons; SN, striatonigral projection neurons; TAN, striatal tonically active
neurons (i.e., cholinergic interneurons).
simpliﬁcation is justiﬁed by the fact the further information pro-
cessing that might occur in these nuclei (e.g., Bar-Gad et al., 2000)
is not relevant for the scope of this paper, and would not affect the
localist representation format used in this model.
To maintain the correct direction of the effect of the two path-
ways, SN neurons were modeled as sending excitatory (instead of
inhibitory) signals to the thalamus, while the model SP neurons
send inhibitory projections (see Figure 3). A similar simpliﬁcation
scheme has been previously used in other basal ganglia models
(Frank et al., 2001). Also, the hyperdirect pathway that proceeds
from the cortex to the output nuclei through the sub-thalamic
nucleus has also been left out of the BABE model. These parts of
the circuit play a signiﬁcant functional role in the biological basal
ganglia circuit, and in particular in response inhibition (see, for
instance, Frank et al., 2007) and action selection (Gurney et al.,
2001; Nambu et al., 2002). However, response inhibition does not
play a signiﬁcant role in this research, and action selection has been
simpliﬁed as a Boltzmann selection algorithm. Thus, the omitted
parts of the circuit are not relevant to the topics discussed in this
paper.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the biological basal ganglia
circuit also includes feedback projections that proceed from lower
to higher nuclei in the circuit tree. For instance, there are projec-
tions from the thalamus to the striatum (Sidibé et al., 2002; Smith
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et al., 2004), from the thalamus to cholinergic interneurons (Lap-
per and Bolam, 1992), and from the globus pallidus to GABA-ergic
striatal interneurons (Bevan et al., 1998). These ascending projec-
tions are thought to play an import control function (Redgrave
et al., 1999). Because the arrangement of circuit has been simpli-
ﬁed,ourmodel includes only a simple feedback system represented
by excitatory projections from the model thalamus to the SN and
SP cells. These pathways are important to allow the BABE model
to converge toward stable states.
Representation of context and choices in the cortex and basal
ganglia
The BABEmodel encodes decisions and actions in a simple localist
fashion, so that each particular pair of stimuli (the decision con-
text) and the each possible choice (the actions) are represented by
a single model neuron. A real biological system is unlikely to revert
to such a brittle representation scheme,but localist representations
have the advantage of simplifying the model to terms that are eas-
ier to analyze, implement, and to visualize. In fact,many proposed
models of the basal ganglia adopt localist or quasi-localist rep-
resentations (Barto, 1995; Suri and Schultz, 1999; Frank et al.,
2001; Gurney et al., 2001; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). Furthermore,
large-scale biological models can be build to approximate compu-
tations described by localist networks (Eliasmith and Anderson,
2003), and the computational principles of this framework can
be generalized to other representation schemes. Thus, the use of
localist representations does not compromise the soundness of
our conclusions.
In the representation scheme used for the simulations, each of
the three pair of stimuli in the simulated task (AB, CD, and EF) is
represented by the activation of a single neuron in a set of three.
Therefore, each pair is encoded as an individual decision cue. The
same representation format is used for both the “decision context”
and the “time context,” with the difference that the time context
contains enough units to represent each stimulus pair across dif-
ferent phases of a trial (see Figure 4). Each of the six possible
stimulus choices (A through F) is represented by a corresponding
unit in the SN and SP cells and in the Thalamus.
The reinforcement learning system
The BABE model uses the PVLV system developed by O’Reilly
et al. (2007) as its reinforcement learning system (akin to the
“critic” in an actor–critic architecture). In PVLV, the dopamine
response is the sum of the signals computed by two subsystems,
the primary value (PV) and the learned value (LV) component
(see Figure 3). The PV system learns over time the degree of
predictability between a primary reward and the state of the
environment where the reward is delivered. The LV component,
instead, learns the degree of predictability between a state of the
environment and the future primary rewards that will be deliv-
ered, based on how predictably the given state will lead to the state
where rewards are delivered.
Each of the two subsystems is further divided into two parts,
an excitatory part (PVe, LVe) and an inhibitory one (PVi, LVi, see
Figure 4).Within each sub-system, the excitatory part learns faster
than the inhibitory part. The activity of PVe reﬂects the immedi-
ate reward being delivered at a given state. As the primary reward
FIGURE 4 | Implementation of the BABE model. Separated pools of
neurons represent gray matter nuclei and cortical regions; the height and
color of the each unit represents the amount of neuronal activation. Dotted
arrows represent inhibitory projections, while solid lines represent
excitatory projections. Context, cortical region representing the current
decision context (i.e., one of the pairs AB, CD, or EF ); Time, cortical region
representing the current phase in the decision trial; LVe, LVi, PVe, PVi,
components of the PVLV reinforcement learning system (see main text for
details); Da, dopaminergic neurons; SP, striatopallidal projection neurons;
SN, striatonigral projection neurons; TAN, striatal tonically active neurons
(i.e., cholinergic interneurons).
becomes ﬁrmly associated to the condition where it is delivered,
the contribution of PVi increases and cancels out that of PVe.
Therefore, the more a reward is expected, the less effective it is. At
the same time, LVe learns to associate the value of the reward to
those conditions and states of the environment that are ultimately
conducive to its delivery. As a result, the excitatory activity of a pri-
mary reward shifts back in time to the earliest state that is reliably
associated to it. Finally, the LVi system slowly learns to expect and
cancel out the activity of LVe. The response of dopamine neurons
is a function of the sum of the contribution of both the PV and
the LV inhibitory and excitatory components (see Appendix for a
complete description of the equations governing the system).
Although being somewhat unusual because not based on a
Temporal Difference algorithm (Sutton, 1988), PVLV is as suc-
cessful as any other reinforcement learning model in reproducing
the distinctive features of dopamine neurons response. These fea-
tures include the decrease in the activity of dopamine neurons
as the reward becomes predictable, and their response’s shift-
ing back in time to predictive cues. Furthermore O’Reilly et al.
(2007) have proposed a convincing anatomical substrate for each
of the PVLV components, while the physiological substrates of
most neurobiological models based on TD-learning have been
called into question (Joel et al., 2002). In particular, the LV sys-
tem has been proposed to correspond to the computations of the
ventral striatum, thus suggesting an anatomical connection with
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the computations occurring in the basal ganglia (O’Reilly et al.,
2007) and providing a physiological ground for using it in our
simulation. Finally, PVLV has been previously used as the primary
learning system in other basal ganglia models (Frank and Claus,
2006; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006).
Striatal interneurons
The most crucial part of the BABE model is represented by the
layer of cholinergic TANs, labeled “TAN” in Figures 3 and 4. As
discussed above, these neurons provide both direct and indirect
inhibition for striatal SN and SP neurons, thus controlling their
response to excitatory cortical inputs.
At the onset of behaviorally relevant stimuli, TANs show a sud-
den increase in ﬁring rate, which is followed by a sudden pause in
activity. Although acetylcholine has complex modulatory effects
on striatal projection neurons (e.g., Calabresi et al., 2000a), exper-
imental evidence suggests that its main effect is inhibitory, and
that it is the transient pause in cholinergic activity that allows pro-
jection neurons to ﬁre (Morris et al., 2004; Reynolds and Wickens,
2004; Reynolds et al., 2004; Pakhotin and Bracci, 2007; Bonsi et al.,
2011). In fact, it has been suggested that the primary purpose of
TANs is to detect speciﬁc contexts where routine actions (encoded
within striatal projection neurons) need to be applied (Apicella,
2007).
In addition to responding to cortical signals, striatal choliner-
gic neurons are also sensitive to reward (Morris et al., 2004) and
their response is modulated by dopamine inputs (Bolam et al.,
2000; Reynolds et al., 2004; Tepper and Bolam, 2004). Thus, they
represent the ideal substrate for modulating variability in the way
outlined by our framework.
In the real striatum, TAN modulate the activity of projec-
tion neurons both directly (e.g., Pakhotin and Bracci, 2007;
See Figure 1) and indirectly, via their inﬂuence on GABA-ergic
interneurons (e.g., Koós and Tepper, 2002; See also Figure 1). This
control network was simpliﬁed in the model and reduced to a
single pool of TANs, whose functional role incorporates elements
of GABA-ergic interneurons, such as the strong inhibitory inﬂu-
ence over SN and SP cells. The control of projection neurons was
achieved by setting the initial weights of synapses fromTANs to SN
and SP neurons to such values that no cortical signal can activate
a projection neuron unless TAN activation drops from baseline.
Their elevated tonic activity of cholinergic interneurons was mod-
eled by setting the synapses between cortical cells (i.e., state and
time layers) and TANs to initially elevated values, so that even
minimal cortical stimulation is sufﬁcient to keep them tonically
active. In these synapses, learning occurs by reducing (instead of
increasing) the strength of synapses from cortical inputs of inter-
est. This mechanism was sufﬁcient to reproduce the decrease of
TAN activity at the onset of signiﬁcant inputs (see the Appendix
for a more detailed description of the learning algorithm).
Tonically active neurons also receive projections from
dopamine neurons (Kubota et al., 1987; Lavoie et al., 1989).
Dopaminemodulates the response of TANs in a complexway, acti-
vating both excitatory, D1-like (Aosaki et al., 1998) and inhibitory,
D2-like (DeBoer et al., 1996; Pisani et al., 2000) receptors. Sim-
ulations of these effects suggest that, as in the case of cortical
projections, dopamine release produces initial excitatory burst of
TANactivity,which is followed by a phasic pause (Tan andBullock,
2008). To capture this effect, dopamine projections were modeled
as inhibitory. As outlined in the framework, the model dopamine
modulates the synaptic plasticity of cortical projections to TAN, so
that their inhibitory inﬂuence is reduced by dopamine depletion
(i.e., actual rewards are smaller than expected) and increased by
dopamine release (i.e., actual rewards are larger than expected; See
Appendix for details).
Finally, experimental evidence suggests that that maybe TANs
(Tepper and Bolam, 2004; Tepper and Plenz, 2006; Bonsi et al.,
2011; Chuhma et al., 2011, but see Sullivan et al., 2008 for contrary
evidence) and at least some types of GABA-ergic interneurons
(Ibáñez-Sandoval et al., 2010;Tepper et al., 2010) receive inhibitory
projections from striatal projection neurons. These projections
were modeled as simple inhibitory projections from SN and SP
cells to TANs (see Figure 4). In agreements with what is gener-
ally known about lateral inhibition in the striatum (Jaeger et al.,
1994), these synapses are weak; nonetheless, their feedback sig-
nals is plays an important functional role in making the circuit
converge toward a stable state.
RESULTS
The previous sections have outlined a theory according to which
striatal cholinergic interneurons contribute to learning by modu-
late variability in decision-making. The theory is embodied in a
neurocomputational model of the basal ganglia where a pool of
simulated cholinergic interneurons is introduced to modulate the
activity of the striatal cells that control the execution of an action.
To verify our hypothesis, the BABE model was compared to
a reduced version that shares the same architecture and parame-
ters, but that does not include the layer of interneurons. In this
reduced version the dorsal striatum is entirely composed of SN
and SP projection neurons, which are the direct and only target of
cortical stimulation. This architecture is common to other models
of the basal ganglia, such as PBWM (Frank et al., 2001; O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006) and FROST (Ashby et al., 2005).
In addition to the removal of the TAN units, two additional
changes were made to the reduced model. First, a k-winner-takes-
all (kWTA) algorithm was added to the SN and SP groups. The
kWTA algorithm maintains the ﬁrst k most active units, and sets
to zero the activation values of the rest, reducing the competi-
tion between active units. The kWTA procedure is often used
in computational models of the basal ganglia to mimic internal
lateral inhibition (Frank et al., 2001; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006),
and in preliminary simulations was found to improve the reduced
model’s performance signiﬁcantly. In our simulations, k= 41. The
second change consisted in replacing the original rate-code activa-
tion function of the SN and SP neurons with a more conventional
sigmoid function (see Appendix for details); again, this was found
to improve the performance of the model although reducing
somewhat its biological plausibility.
1The value of k was determined as the smaller integer that guarantees that at least one
neuron encodes the same choice (A,B,. . .F) in both SN and SP cells. A smaller value
of k could lead the model to situations where there is no competition between the
indirect and direct pathway, thus violating one of the core features of the functional
anatomy of the basal ganglia.
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Note that, even without the modulation of TANs, the
reduced version still performs a rudimentary form of explo-
ration/exploitation tradeoff. This is due to the fact that the Boltz-
mann selection rule (Eq. 1, see also Appendix) tends to select
an option in proportion to its expected value (biological models
of action selections, such as Gurney et al., 2001, also tend to do
the same). Thus, as the estimated value of an option increases,
that option will be selected more and more often. The following
tests will show, however, how the addition of TANs signiﬁcantly
improves this mechanism, making the BABE more ﬂexible than a
traditional reinforcement learning model.
The full and reduced versions of the BABE model were then
compared in two tests of performance. Each tests consisted of 100
simulated runs of each model. During each run, one version of
the model (either the full or the reduced version, in alternating
fashion) was generated anew and performed a series of trials with
PS task. During each trial, one of the three stimulus pairs (AB,
CD, or EF) was randomly presented to the model. The model
was then let converge to a stable pattern of Thalamus activations,
which was interpreted as indicating one of the choices A, B, . . .
F. Finally, a decision outcome (either “Correct” or “Incorrect”)
was internally generated based on the success probability asso-
ciated with the given response (see Table 1), and presented to
the model to provide the reward signal necessary for learning.
Each trial was terminated when the decision outcome was pre-
sented to the model, and each run was terminated as soon as the
model reached a predeﬁned performance criterion. The perfor-
mance criterion was different for the two tests (see next sections
for details). A complete description of the computational steps
occurring during a simulated decision-making trial is provided in
the Appendix.
TEST 1: BABE ADVANTAGE IN LEARNING AND RE-LEARNING
The ﬁrst test was designed to verify whether the introduction
of a layer of interneurons does indeed facilitate learning and re-
learning. The rationale for the test is that, by modulating the initial
exploration, the BABE model should discover the best options
faster, and converge on themquicker than the reducedmodel.Also,
the BABE model’s advantage should be greater during re-learning,
since the reduced version has to progressively learn to devaluewhat
was previously the best action before refraining from using it.
To verify these predictions, a test suite was developed where the
model interactedwith the task until its performancewas indicative
of having successfully learned the best option for each pair. The
criterion for successful learning was that, for each pair of stimuli
AB, CD, and EF, the model should have picked the better of the
two options (A, C, and E, respectively) with a probability equal or
superior to the option’s probability of resulting in a correct trial.
For instance, in the case of the pairAB,A is the best option and has
an 80% chance of yielding a “Correct” result; thus, learning was
considered successful for theAB pair when the model selected A at
least 80% of the times. The probability of selecting an option was
calculated over a moving window of the past 10 selections where
the option appeared, and a separate moving window was kept and
updated for each pair.
As soon as the model has reached the criterion for all pairs,
the reward contingencies were suddenly changed, so that the least
successful stimulus within a pair (B, D, and F, respectively) was
now given the most successful one’s probabilities, and vice versa.
For example, in the case of the pair AB, the change resulted in B
being the correct choice 80% (and A only 20%) of the times. The
model was let to interact with the task until it had reached the
criterion again.
We predicted that the full version of the model would learn
faster than the reduced version during the initial phase. The ratio-
nale for this prediction is that the full version of the model should
be faster at shifting from exploration to exploitation, thus selecting
from the best options more frequently and reaching the criterion
faster.
In addition, we predicted that the reduced version of the model
would learn more slowly during the re-learning phase than dur-
ing the initial phase; on the other hand, we expect to ﬁnd little
or no difference between learning and re-learning for the full ver-
sion of the BABE model. The rationale for this prediction is that,
in the reduced model, the amount of exploration is simply pro-
portional to the current value of an option (because selection is
simpliﬁed as a Boltzmann rule), and the model learns by gradually
revising each option’s value estimate until they reach their true
values. Therefore, when the reward probabilities within each pair
are swapped, the reduced model has ﬁrst to unlearn its current
estimates of each option’s value before learning the new ones. For
instance, in the AB pair, the value of A has to be revised down-
wards from a learned 80% reward probability to a mere 20%, and
B has to be revised upwards from 20 to 80%. Before the model
samples with equal frequency from A and B, they both have to
reach an estimated value of 50%. The full model, on the other
hand, reacts to the contingency reversal by quickly reverting to
exploring all the other options, thus not requiring additional time
to relearn.
Results
Figure 5 illustrates the results of the test. The two panels represent
the performances of the reduced (left) and full (right) versions of
the BABE model. Within each individual plot, the bars represent
the number of trials at which the learning criterion was passed for
each of the three pairs during the two learning phases; gray bars
represent the initial learning phase, and dark bars represent the re-
learning phases following reversal. The data were analyzed using a
mixed-effects ANOVA model where the number of trials to reach
the criterion were the dependent measure, and the Model (full vs.
reduced), Trial Type (AB, CD, EF), and Condition (Learning vs.
Re-learning) were the independent measures.
The analysis showed that all the main effects and all the interac-
tions were signiﬁcant (F> 11.52, p< 0.0001). A separate ANOVA
performed on the reduced model data showed that, as predicted,
the reduced model was slower to achieve the criterion during the
re-learning then during the learning phase [F(1,100)= 151.48,
p < 0.0001]; that it was faster to converge on the criterion for the
smaller-contrast trial types [i.e., EF was learned faster than CD,
andCD faster thanAB:F(2,200)= 59.37,p < 0.0001]; and that the
difference between trial types was magniﬁed during re-learning
[F(1,100)= 22.65, p < 0.0001]. In the full version of the BABE
model, on the other hand, there was no difference in performance
between the learning and the re-learning phases (F< 0.001), while
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FIGURE 5 | Performance of the reduced version (left) and of the
full version (right) of the BABE model. Bars represent the number
of trials needs to reach the criterion in the PS task, during either the
initial learning phase (“Learning,” dark gray) or after the reversal of
stimuli probabilities (“Re-learning,” light gray). Values represent
means±SEs.
the signiﬁcant effect of Trial Type [F(1,100)= 3.83, p< 0.03] was
due to EF trials being learned slower than the other two.
In summary, the introduction of cholinergic interneurons to
modulate the response variability results in a signiﬁcant improve-
ment in decision-makingperformance.Consistentwith the frame-
work outlined herein, the model can use the difference between
expected and predicted rewards to explore new options and thus
adapt in a changing environment.
TEST 2: MODULATION OF VARIABILITY AND SUCCESS EXPECTATIONS
Theﬁrst test has established that introducing cholinergic interneu-
rons improves themodel’s performance in a decision-making task.
However, our framework speciﬁcally claims that the performance
improvement is due to better and more adaptive modulation of
response variability. This claim implies that (a) The model should
modulate response variability in response to a change in the reward
contingencies (such as the reversal of success probabilities); and
(b) That performance improvements should correlate negatively
with response variability.
A second test was performed to verify these predictions. During
this test, each model performed the PS task until it had success-
ful learned the best response for the AB trials. Success in learning
was assessed using the same criterion as in the previous test, i.e.,
by checking whether the best option (A before reversal, and B
after) was chosen at least 80% of the times in the previous 10 tri-
als. Upon reaching the criterion, the success probabilities within
each pair were swapped. Performance of the model was then
recorded until it had performed an additional 100 AB-type tri-
als. Although CD and EF trials were still randomly intermixed
with AB trials, this test focuses on AB trials only, as they are
those where the difference between the full and reduced versions
of the BABE model become more apparent in re-learning (see
Figure 5).
Results
In order to analyze the modulation of response variability, the
activity of SN and SP cells was recorded at each trial, and the
group entropy H was calculated separately for the SN and SP
cells. Entropy is used in information theory as a measure of the
information content of a message: the higher the entropy level,
the lower the amount of information that is conveyed. Entropy is
also used in thermodynamics as a measure of uncertainty of the
state of a physical system: the higher the entropy, the more chaotic
and unpredictable is the system. In the case of SN and SP cells,
entropy provides a convenient way to relate the state of activa-
tion of striatal projection neurons to the uncertainty of the ﬁnal
behavioral response made by the model. When many SN cells are
active at the same time, entropy is high, implying that the informa-
tion available in the system is low (as there is no clear preference
for one action over the others) and the system is less predictable
(different response might be selected). Similarly, when only few
SN cells are active, entropy is low, implying that the information
available is elevated (there is a clear preference for one action) and
the ﬁnal behavioral response is more predictable. Because of this
properties, entropy provides a convenient way to relate a physical
property of themodel striatum(the pattern of activation inprojec-
tion neurons) to uncertainty and behavioral response variability
(the action that would eventually be selected).
Entropy was calculated as follow:
H = −
∑
i
p (i) log p (i)
Where p(i) is the probability of neuron i encoding the ﬁnal
response, which was estimated by dividing each cell’s activation
value over the sum of all the activation values of SN or SP units.
To accommodate random chaotic variations during a model’s
interaction, the values of H for each run of each model were
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normalized, so that they had a mean of 0 and a SD of 1. The
normalization was needed because the two models (and each run
of each model) have different baseline entropy levels. The normal-
ization process removes this baseline differences while preserving
the time course of entropy across the task and the modulation of
entropy in response to the reversal of contingencies. Note that,
although entropy can only be a positive quantity, its normalized
version can take both positive and negative values (because its
mean is constrained to be 0). To track the variations of entropy
over time, the entire time series of 130 trails (30 preceding and 100
following the reversal) was divided into blocks of 10 trials each,
and the averages for each block calculated.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 6. In the ﬁgure,
the data from the reduced model is on the left, and data from the
full version of the model is on the right; within each plot, points
and lines in dark gray represent values for SP cells, and those in
light gray represent values for SN cells. The vertical dotted line
represents the moment where the probabilities were reversed.
In the ﬁgure, entropy follows different time courses for the
two models. In fact, entropy in both SN and SP cells correlates
negatively with time in the reduced model (Spearman’s r > 0.85,
p< 0.0002) but not in the case of the full version of the BABE
model. This decline of entropywith timemight be the cause for the
greater difﬁculty shown by the reduced version to learn the correct
options after the reversal (see previous section and Figure 5).
Despite exhibiting different time courses,bothmodels are capa-
ble of modulating entropy in response to changing contingencies,
as shown by the increase in entropy after reversal and as assessed
by a series of t -tests (t> 4.66, p< 0.001). To assess whether the
models differ, entropymodulation in both SNandSP cellswas esti-
mated as the difference between the highest entropy value after the
reversal and the value immediate before the reversal. An ANOVA
was then performed using the modulation estimates as the depen-
dent variable, the neuron type (SN vs. SP) and the model (Full
vs. Reduced version) as the independent variables, and model run
as the error term. The results of the ANOVA showed that the full
FIGURE 6 |Time course of the entropy level in the SN and SP cells
across the 13 blocks ofTest 2 for the reduced (left) and full version
(right) of the BABE model.The dark gray lines and circles represent
entropy in the SP cells; the light lines and circles represent entropy in the
SN cells. Points represent mean values, and the vertical line indicates the
point where the success contingencies were reversed during the test.
BABE model’s modulation of entropy was larger than the reduced
version’s [F(1,87)= 20.42,p= 0.0002], but that there was no main
effect of neuron type, and no interaction [F< 2.58, p> 0.1]. Thus,
the full version of the BABE model shows a larger modulation of
entropy in response to the reversal of success probabilities.
To make a stronger case for the claim that the model’s mod-
ulation of variability (as indexed by the entropy in SN and SP
cells) occurs in response to changes in success probabilities, each
model’s entropy level for SN and SP cells was regressed over
performance, calculated as the probability of selecting the most-
rewarding option (A before reversal,B after reversal) in a particular
block. To make the data as comparable as possible, the ﬁrst and the
last two blocks were excluded from the analysis. The exclusion was
due to the fact that the ﬁrst block is affected by the large difference
in the initial entropy between the two models (see Figure 6), while
in the last two blocks the full model’s performance has grown
signiﬁcantly higher than the reduced version’s (p< 0.001). There-
fore, blocks 2 through 11 permitted a fairer comparison between
the two models.
Figure 7 illustrates the results of this analysis in form of scatter-
plots, with entropy on the x-axis and performance on the y-axis.
As in Figure 6, the data from the reduced model is on the left,
and data from the full version of the model is on the right; within
each plot, points and lines in dark gray represent values for SN
cells, and those in light gray represent values for SP cells. As pre-
dicted, performance does not inversely correlate with entropy in
the reduced model; in fact, the slope of the regression line was pos-
itive for both SN and SP cells [even if not signiﬁcantly so in the case
of SN: β= 1.00, t (8)= 0.95, p= 0.37; and β= 1.38, t (8)= 2.44,
p= 0.04, respectively]. On the contrary, performance was a reli-
able predictor of entropy in the case of the full version of the BABE
model, with poorer performance being signiﬁcantly associated to
more entropy in both SN and SP cells [β=−0.67, t (8)=−2.52,
p= 0.04; and β=−2.00, t (8)= –4.24, p= 0.004, respectively].
FIGURE 7 | Correlations between performance and entropy levels for
the reduced (left) and full version (right) of the BABE model.
Performance (for the AB pairs only) is the abscissa, and entropy on the
ordinate; The dark circles represent the SP cells; the dark dotted lines
represents the regression lines for the SP cells; the light lines and circles
represent entropy the SN cells; the dark dotted lines represents the
regression lines for the SN cells.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience February 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 18 | 12
Stocco Cholinergic control of decision-making variability
In summary, the results of this test have shown that the intro-
duction of cholinergic interneurons results in a modulation of
response variability that is larger in response to changes in the
reward contingences, more directly coupled with immediate per-
formance, and less dependent on the amount of experience with
the task, allowing for a quicker adaptive response in the face of
changing contingencies.
DISCUSSION
This paper presented a theory on how cholinergic interneurons
(also known as TANs) in the striatum contribute importantly to
decision-making by adaptivelymodulating the variability of action
and option selection. The theorywas implemented in a neurocom-
putational model of the basal ganglia circuit (called BABE) that
was tested using an iterative decision-making task. The results
showed that, compared to a reduced version that does not include
modulation from acetylcholine interneurons, the BABE model
is faster at learning, more capable of re-learning in response to
perceived changes in action–reward contingencies, and more suc-
cessful at balancing between exploration and exploitation in the
face of a changing environment.
ROLE OF STRIATAL INTERNEURONS
The proposed framework accounts for the role of striatal interneu-
rons in the striatum, and in particular cholinergic interneurons,
therefore providing a more biologically accurate characteriza-
tion of striatal functions and computations. Although cholinergic
interneurons have been previously included in detailed models
of basal ganglia physiology (e.g., Wickens et al., 1991; Tan and
Bullock, 2008; Humphries et al., 2009, 2010), their role has been
overlooked by most of the models of the basal ganglia role in to
cognition (Barto, 1995; Beiser and Houk, 1998; Suri and Schultz,
1998, 1999; Amos, 2000; Frank et al., 2001; Gurney et al., 2001;
Ashby et al., 2005, 2007; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). A few models
have accounted for cholinergic contributions, but have conceived
of them in different, although not mutually exclusive, ways. For
example, Stocco et al. (2010) suggested that the TANs provide
a mechanism to limit striatal responses to speciﬁc contexts, and
Ashby andCrossley (2011) proposed that cholinergic interneurons
make reinforcement learning more precise by restricting the num-
ber of neurons where dopamine induces synaptic plasticity. Since
bothmodels rely on the cholinergic interneuronsmodulating their
inhibition on projection neurons, they are both compatible with
the proposed framework. Theoretical integration of these differ-
ent functions of cholinergic interneurons is an interesting future
direction to extend the BABE model.
SKILL ACQUISITION AND BIRDSONG LEARNING
One of the advantages of the proposed framework is that it rec-
onciles two alternative views of the role of basal ganglia in skill
learning, i.e., the view that the basal ganglia rapidly form stimulus–
response associations, and the view that they provide variability in
behavior (as in the case of birdsong learning). The BABE model
claims that the two types of contribution occur at the same time,
and are related to two different neurotransmitters (dopamine vs.
acetylcholine) and two different types of neurons (projection neu-
rons vs. interneurons) in the striatum, thus providing a framework
where the two views can co-exist. In particular, this paper has
proposed that the generation of variability in songbird vocaliza-
tion during the learning phase is underpinned by acetylcholine
and its effects on striatal interneurons. Under this hypothesis,
the eventual, “crystallized” phase where a songbird’s song is ﬁxed
and stereotyped can be seen as the ﬁnal exploitation of acquired
knowledge in decision-making, while the generation of variable
vocalization during the learning phase can be seen as the result of
increased exploration among possible options.
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION
An important and novel contribution of this paper is that it
accounts for how exploration and exploitation are balanced dur-
ing decision-making. This account is set apart from other theories
by employing the very same signals (e.g., dopamine) and circuitry
(e.g., competing SN and SP cells) that are already present in other
reinforcement learning models of the basal ganglia (Frank et al.,
2001; Joel et al., 2002; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006). In contrast, pre-
vious biological models of the balance between exploration and
exploitation relied on the introduction of somewhat novel mech-
anisms, such as, for example, introducing an uncertainty signal
based on norepinephrine (Doya, 2002;Yu and Dayan, 2005; Dayan
and Yu, 2006). One possibility is that different brain signals con-
tribute to the modulate response variability, with acetylcholine
relating variability to on-line performance measures (as in this the
proposed framework) and norepinephrine relating response vari-
ability to other factors, such as general arousal (e.g., Aston-Jones
and Cohen, 2005a,b).
Existing experimental evidence suggests that exploratory
actions are based, in part, on contributions from prefrontal cor-
tex (Daw et al., 2006). The current model is not inconsistent with
these ﬁndings, as ultimately the computations performed in the
basal ganglia result in a projection of information to the prefrontal
cortex through the thalamus (Alexander et al., 1986; Albin et al.,
1989; DeLong, 1990). Furthermore, it is worth noting that bal-
ancing between exploration and exploitation is a basic biological
need, and can be observed in animals (e.g., in rats: Penner and
Mizumori, 2012) whose prefrontal circuitry is not as sophisticated
as in humans. Thus, the association between exploratory deci-
sions and prefrontal cortex activation in humans might be due
to some explicit, deliberative process instead of the automatic,
reinforcement-based mechanism described herein. This explana-
tion is consistent with the idea that prefrontal cortex and the
basal ganglia both contribute to human decision-making, but
that, while the basal ganglia implements a “model-free” system
that selects actions based on their perceived values, the richest
representations of prefrontal cortex also enable a “model-based”
form of reinforcement learning that selects actions based on an
internal representations of their consequences (Daw et al., 2005,
2011; Gläscher et al., 2010). Within this duel-system framework,
exploration might originate in the prefrontal cortex as a means of
building an internal model of the results of each action, which are
subsequently used tomodulate action selection in the basal ganglia
loops. This dual-model approach, however, does not rule out the
existence of simpler mechanism to modulate exploratory decision
within the striatal microcircuitry, akin to the one described in this
paper.
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EXTENSIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
In its current formulation, the model has a number of limitations.
For instance, the model only includes cholinergic interneurons,
and does not include the contribution of GABA-ergic interneu-
rons. In fact, there are various types of GABA-ergic interneurons in
the striatum, which have important modulatory effects on striatal
function (Bonsi et al., 2011) and might interact with choliner-
gic interneurons as well (Sullivan et al., 2008). Also, the model
accounts only for the inhibitory effect of acetylcholine, while this
neurotransmitter has complex effects on its post-synaptic tar-
gets and on synaptic plasticity (Calabresi et al., 2000a). Finally,
the model currently does not have a realistic system for action
selection, which is simpliﬁed as a Boltzmann selection algorithm
among those options whose corresponding cells are active. A more
realistic system should include a biological mechanism determin-
ing a single action to be executed, probably by including the
hyperdirect pathway (Gurney et al., 2001; Nambu et al., 2002).
Despite its limitations, the generality of the proposed frame-
work makes it possible to integrate it with other models and
architectures and apply it to other domains. For instance, basal
ganglia models have been successfully applied to model behavioral
impairments in Parkinson’s disease (Frank, 2005; Stocco et al.,
2010). Because Parkinson’s disease originates from a depletion
of dopamine in the basal ganglia (Jankovic, 2008), reinforcement
learningmodels have provided a natural and successful framework
to account for this impairment. Our model, however, provides a
more complete account of neuromodulation in the striatum, and
can be used, for instance to account for the positive effects of
anti-cholinergic drugs in the treatment of the disease (Jankovic,
2008; Jankovic and Aguilar, 2008).
Also, two existing models of basal ganglia (PBWM; Frank et al.,
2001; and the Conditional Routing model, Stocco et al., 2010)
are based on the proposition that the basal ganglia play an even
more general role in cognition than action selection. In PBWM,
the basal ganglia control the access of working memory; and in the
Conditional Routing model, the basal ganglia dynamically modify
how signals are transferred to cortical regions. In both models,
the basal ganglia allow for a rapid re-organization of brain activ-
ity, making them capable of performing unusually complex tasks.
Within these models, modulation of response variability does not
only result in exploration of the best options, but also in the explo-
rations of novel ways to perform complex tasks. Thus, in principle,
the cholinergic modulatory system could be used to explain how
novel and creative lines of thoughts are generated in human cogni-
tion. Within the decision-making literature, this could be used to
explain, for example, reward-based switches between alternative
decision strategies within the same task (Stocco et al., 2009).
In summary, the proposed framework provides a simple yet
powerful way to account for how response variability (and, in
turn, exploration and exploitation) is modulated within the basal
ganglia circuit.When applied to decision-making tasks, the frame-
work results in signiﬁcant performance improvements and greater
behavioral ﬂexibility. Future extensions of the BABE model will
include applications to domains other than decision-making, pro-
viding a general mechanism for understanding action selection
and information routing in the brain.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix describes the details of the implementation of the
BABE model and the learning algorithm it uses.
MODEL NEURONS
In the model, neurons were implemented as simple computational
units that apply an activation function f over an input value η to
yield an activation value, denoted by x. The input value η is simply
the sum of all the activations coming from the projecting neurons,
weighted by the corresponding synaptic strengths:
η =
∑
j
wjxj
where wj is the value (or “synaptic weight”) of the synapse from
neuron j, xj is the activation of neuron j. This is perhaps the sim-
plest and most common representation for artiﬁcial neurons, and
is widely adopted in many biological models (see O’Reilly and
Munakata, 2000).
The activation value x is obtained from the net input η by
applying the activation function f:
x = f (η− θ)
where θ is the neuron’s threshold, which can be thought of an ini-
tial resistance of every neuron to be excited. A negative threshold
(so that the quantity η− θ is positive in absence of direct stimula-
tion) can be used to model neurons with elevated tonic activities,
or to compensate the effects of convergent inhibitory projections.
The activation value x is supposed to be the computational coun-
terpart of a neuron’s ﬁring rate. Note that a neuron’s dynamic is
completely characterized by its activation function and threshold.
Activation functions
With the exception of dopamine neurons (which are discussed in
the next section), all the neurons in the model use only two types
of activation functions. Neurons in the PV i, LV e, and LV i nuclei
use a sigmoid activation function as:
x = 1(
1 + eγ(η−θ))
whereγ is the gainparameter that determines the curves’steepness.
Value of the sigmoid activation function are always in the range
[0, 1], and thus provide a convenient way to represent neuronal
ﬁring rates between a natural lower bound (x= 0, corresponding
to no action potential) and a normalized maximum (x = 1).
The activation of neurons in the SN, SP, TAN, and
SNr/Thalamus nuclei, on the other hand, is modeled as a
hyperbolic tangent:
x = tanh (γ [η− θ]+
)
where γ is the gain parameter the [. . .]+ notation indicates that
negative values inside square brackets are treated as zeroes. This
ensures that the output of the function is in the range [0, 1].
Together with the sigmoid function, the hyperbolic tangent is
among the simplest formulae that ﬁt the change of spiking rates
following changes in membrane potential in biological neurons;
the curve also closelymimics the variationof spike rates to a change
in the membrane potentials in biological neurons (O’Reilly and
Munakata, 2000).
In the reduced version of the BABE model, the activation func-
tion of SN and SP cells was changed from a hyperbolic tangent to
a sigmoid. This choice was made because sigmoid functions were
found to yield better performance in the reduced version of the
model (but not in the normal version).
Application of kWTA
The competition between the direct and the indirect pathways in
the model produces different activation values for the different
possible actions represented in the SNr/Thalamus nucleus. How-
ever, eventually the model has to select only one stimulus, even if
values are provided for more than one. Different mechanisms are
possible for solving this competition, including some at the corti-
cal level. However, to keep the matters as simple a possible, both
the BABE model and its reduced version include a kWTA mech-
anism. The kWTA is a common solution to implement complex
inhibitory dynamics within a population of neurons (O’Reilly and
Munakata, 2000). The procedure simply consists of identifying k
units whose activation is going to be maintained, and forcing to
zero the activation value of the remaining ones. The probability
p(i) of selecting a i as part of the k ones that will be maintained is
a Boltzmann function of its activation A(i):
p (i ∈ k) = e
A(i)/T
∑
j e
A(j)/T
where T is the temperature. In the case of Thalamus, k= 1
and T= 0.01, which means that the procedure selects almost
deterministically the most active unit.
Model dynamics
The model progresses through three phases for each trial, a deci-
sion (+) phase, a feedback (−) phase, and a learning (++) phase.
The progression through each of these phases can be summarized
as follows:
1. During the decision (+) phase,
1.1. The cortical “Context” units are clamped to the value
corresponding to the given pair of stimuli;
1.2. The cortical “Time” units are clamped to the values
corresponding to the ﬁrst phase of the task;
1.3. The value of PVe is set of the neutral value of 0.5.
1.4. All the non-clampednuclei of themodel are then iteratively
updated until they converge to a ﬁxed stable state.
1.5. The value of the Thalamus cells is then read out.
1.5.1. If one Thalamus neuron is active (i.e, its activation is
greater than zero), then the corresponding stimulus
is taken to be the model’s decision.
1.5.2. If no Thalamus is active, then one of the six stim-
uli is selected at random, and the corresponding
Thalamus unit activation is set to 1.0.
2. During the feedback (–) phase,
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2.1. The values of cortical Context units and Thalamus output
units are clamped to the their current values;
2.2. The values of the “Time” units are moved “back” (see
Figure 4), to represent the moment after a decision is
made.
2.3. The value of the PVe unit is set to match the outcome of
the previous decision:
2.3.1. If the decision resulted in a“Correct”feedback, then
the value of PVe is set to 0.8;
2.3.2. Otherwise, if the decision resulted in an“Incorrect”
feedback, then the value of PVe is set to 0.2;
2.3.3. Otherwise, if the previous decision corresponded to
a stimulus not currently presented in the stimulus
pair (e.g., the response was “C” to the pair “AB”),
then the value of PVe is set to 0.0.
2.4. All the non-clamped nuclei of the model are then iter-
atively updated until they converge to a ﬁxed stable
state.
3. During the learning phase (++), the synaptic values of the fol-
lowing projections are updated (see below for speciﬁc details
pertaining each projection).
3.1. The projection from the cortical “state” units to:
3.1.1. The striatal TAN cells.
3.1.2. The striatal SN units and SP cells
3.1.3. The PVi, LVe, and LVi cells.
3.2. The projections from the cortical Time units to:
3.2.1. The PVi, LVe, and LVi cells.
Learning in the PVLV system
This section will summarize brieﬂy the PVLV system learning
rules. A complete description of the system and the rationale
behind each equation is provided in O’Reilly et al. (2007). In our
model, the PVe nucleus never actually learns: it simply reﬂects
the value of primary rewards (when they are delivered). The PVi
nucleus, on the other hand, learns to predict the circumstances
where a primary reward will be delivered, and this cancels out the
PVe excitatory effect in as much as the rewards is associated at a
given state and time. Thus, in the case of PVi the strength of each
synapse wi from a “time” unit i to PVi is then incremented by an
amount Δwi that is calculated as follows:
Δwi = ε1 ([PV e] − [PV i]) xi
Where the notation“[. . .]” indicates the value encoded by the cells
of the nucleus within square brackets, and xi is the activation of
the projecting cell i. During the simulations, the value of ε was set
to 0.25.
While PVi learns continuously, learning in LVe and LVi is con-
tingent on the actual or expected primary rewards being notice-
able, i.e., either raising above an upper threshold Tmax or falling
below a predeﬁned lower threshold Tmin. The Boolean variable
PVﬁlter records whether PVe or PVi lay beyond the thresholds, and
is calculated as follows:
PVﬁlter =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1, if [PVe] > Tmaxor [PV e] < Tminor [PV i]
> Tmaxor [PV i] < Tmin
0, otherwise
The synaptic values wi of a LVe unit receiving inputs from a“state”
or “time” unit i is then updated by the following quantity:
Δwi =
{
ε1 ([PV e] − [LV e]) xi , if PV ﬁlter
0, otherwise
Synapses to the LVi nucleus are updated according to the same
rule, but use a slower learning rate ε2 < ε1. In our simulations,
ε2 = 0.025.
Dopamine activation
In PVLV the activation of dopamine neurons is partly a linear acti-
vation the difference in of activation in the PV or in the LV nuclei,
depending on the presence of primary rewards. In particular, the
activation of dopamine neurons was calculated as follows:
Da =
{
[PV e] − [PVi] if PVﬁlter
[LV e] − [LV i] otherwise
This ensures that dopamine reﬂects the difference in expectations
in primary rewards, if there are any, or in rewards predictions if
primary rewards are not present.
Modulatory effects of dopamine on striatal SN and SP neurons
In addition to a direct input to striatal units, dopamine seems to
have the modulatory of sharpening and enhancing their response
(Hernandez-Lopez et al., 2000; Nicola et al., 2000; Frank, 2005).
To account for this effect, the model adopted the solution pro-
posed by O’Reilly and Frank (2006) to make the contribution
from dopamine projections partly a function of the difference in
striatal activity between the feedback (−) and the decision (+)
phases. For example, the net input di from dopamine neurons to
an SN cell i was calculated as:
di = γwi[Da] + (1 − γ)wix+i [Da]
Where x+i is the activation of i in the decision phase, x
−
i is the
activation during the learning phase, and [Da] is the activation
value of the dopamine unit. The parameter γ balances between
the net and the modulatory effects, and, as in O’Reilly and Frank
(2006), was set to a ﬁxed value for 0.5 for both models during all
simulations.
Learning in the striatum
Learning in the striatum occurs at the level of synapses between
the cortical “state”units and the SN, SP, and TAN cells. In all cases,
learning is a function of the difference in activation between the
learning (+) and the feedback (−) phases. In the case of SN and
SP cells, each synapse was updated by an amount corresponding
to:
Δw = r[Da] (x−s − x+s
)
xi
where xs is the activation of the striatal cell s, xi is the activation
value of the cortical “state”or “time”unit, and [Da] is the absolute
activation value of dopamine neurons. The parameter r is the
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learning rate, and was ﬁxed to 1.5 for SN cells and −1.0 for SP
cells. The difference is sign between the two learning rates reﬂects
the need for learning to proceed in the opposite directions for SN
and SP cells. The difference in magnitude between the two values
reﬂects an initial bias that was given to the model for learning to
perform decisions, even if possibly wrong, rather than learning to
withhold a correct one. As in the case of other parameters, the
value of r was kept constant across models and simulations.
Learning for TAN units follows a similar rule, with two minor
variations, except that the learning was modulated by a different
rate parameter t, which was ﬁxed to 0.5.
Δw =
{
rT |Da|
(
x−s − x+s
)
xi if x+s > L and x−s > L
0 otherwise
where rT is the TAN-speciﬁc learning rate, which was set to 0.5,
and L is a lower limit on the activation values of striatal interneu-
rons, which was set to 0.03. The limit is needed to avoid incurring
in situationswhere,due to repeated negative feedback, the synaptic
weights decrease to a point where only unrealistically high cortical
inputs can excite the interneurons.
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